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INTRODUCTION 
Why should investors still be interested in Italy? With the 
collapse of some of the biggest Italian corporations, like Alitalia and 
Ilva, now is the time to rethink the role of foreign investments in the 
country. This Article seeks to demonstrate the suitability of 
regulations for establishing a restructuring plan, specifically 
targeting those regulations meant to harmonize market prerogatives 
with public interests during a time of economic crisis. In particular, 
this Article explores the interplay between corporate contingencies 
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and the role of the public administration in the pursuit of a dynamic 
governance strategy for the Italian economic system using the 
inductive method.1 
Recent reforms in the Italian insolvency regulatory 
framework, with ongoing amendments on restructuring plans, have 
created momentum for a reorganization of domestic corporate 
strategies vis-à-vis investor demands. Drawing lessons from the 
Italian experience, this Article challenges traditional ways of 
approaching bankruptcy proceedings and offers a contextually richer 
understanding the advantages to restructuring plans.  
A restructuring plan in the Italian domestic legal system 
through a ‘forward-looking’ strategy aims to achieve a fresh start for 
debtors’ business affairs. As a result, the advantages to undertake a 
restructuring plan is that an economic balance can be preserved 
through a less formal and more flexible tool as opposed to judicial 
intervention, which is typical in bankruptcy procedures. In this fashion, 
the restructuring plan could encourage broader state engagement in times 
of economic crisis, aiming to promptly and effectively address market 
prerogatives and public interests. 
This study will shed light on the way the Italian business 
reorganization process is aimed at fostering growth and economic 
stability. Determining how a new legal framework could attract 
foreign investment is key to assessing success in the Italian model. 
In this respect, not only may restructuring plans serve as a basis for 
                                                             
1 The inductive method represents a preferred theory in contemporary 
international law. See William Thomas Worster, The Inductive and Deductive 
Methods in Customary Internationa lLaw Analysis: Traditional and Modern 
Approaches, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. 445 (2014). This method aims to garner 
inferences from particular events, acts, or phenomena in order to derive a general 
rule. Whether it is impossible to draw verdicts on the inferences that were 
ascertained, the validity of the conclusion lies on the quality of evidence used to 
support it. See John Vickers, The Problem of Induction§ 2, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., rev. ed. 2010),  
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/. In order to provide adequate 
and genuine evidence, the Article takes into account emblematic cases of 
corporate contingencies with regard to the Italian economic system, in order to 
support the analysis on restructuring models. 
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economic revival, but also as a bulwark for social protection. 
I. Background  
A. Restructuring Plans: A ‘Forward-looking’ Model 
Restructuring plans represent a concrete legal tool for public 
intervention in the economy. These plans not only aim at preserving 
the productive body of the corporation, but also ensure job security 
in order to promote economic equilibrium.2 The management of the 
ongoing economic crisis would be best taken out through these 
‘forward-looking’ models, which have two central goals. On one 
hand, such a model aims at promoting continuity in business activity 
through the attraction of foreign direct investment (“FDI”). On the 
other hand, it fosters built-in defenses for the domestic system 
through the recovery of production capacity and social protection, 
which ultimately support job security. As a result, forward-looking 
restructuring plans support national and international core business 
goals while also creating a fertile legal and administrative ground 
for foreign investors. 
Restructuring is one strategy for corporations to avoid a total 
termination of their business, while also achieving economic 
continuity in the market. This is a public policy that aims to mitigate 
economic and social consequences, while negotiating different 
positions taken by investors and owners that hold company equity, 
as well as lenders and creditors who control debt. The rationale is to 
provide an effective and prompt solution to an emergency in the 
corporate condition.3 
The restructuring process entails radical reforms in a 
                                                             
2 See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS, 433 (6th ed., 2015) (analyzing restructuring plans in 
bankruptcy as a creative corporate finance tool, posing as an alternative to 
liquidation). 
3 Colin Anderson & David Morrison, The Commencement of the Company 
Rescue: How and when does it start?, in INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY LAW: 
THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES, 83, 83–85 (Paul J. Omar ed., 2008) (analyzing the 
rise of the so-called “rescue culture” and the determination of a rescue regime in 
insolvency procedure). 
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corporation’s organization and structure in order to address serious 
financial and operational issues that could lead to shut down or 
liquidation. During this process, the organization’s ownership 
changes and new contractual relationships are formed with 
creditors, debt holders, shareholders, employees, and other 
stakeholders. Ideally, restructuring will lead to the creation of 
businesses that are more likely to attract FDI with sound policy and 
regulatory framework supporting them. This ultimately revives the 
corporation to be a productive and profitable entity. Policymakers 
have struggled with large corporate business crises, as they hold an 
endemic risk tied to industry and large-scale unemployment. In 
other words, this is a public policy problem that needs to be 
addressed with appropriate legal tools, driven by flexibility and 
urgency. 
Despite their relevance, restructuring plans have hardly been 
implemented through organic domestic regulation in response to a 
major corporate business crisis. Instead, such situations have 
historically been deferred to ad hoc laws for singular enterprises 
about to collapse. Both the rationale and effects of restructuring 
plans, with regard to 2007-8 global economic crisis, have rarely been 
the subject of research by international scholars. Within this 
framework, a “rescue culture” has emerged as demonstrated by the 
recent guidelines on insolvency authored by UNCITRAL and the 
World Bank.4  
The traditional legal instruments that have dealt with business 
crises are grounded in bankruptcy law, which defers to the judiciary 
to determine the competence of the corporation’s dismissal. Threats 
of another global economic crisis establish the need for different 
responses, as well as more effective and prompt solutions. In this 
                                                             
4 See IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 500–503 
(2d dd., 2005) (on the quest for international standards and principles in 
insolvency procedures, set out by the major international institutions, as 
UNCITRAL or the World Bank in 1999); see also TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & 
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT: GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 96–112 (2009) (analyzing the role of International Financial 
Institutions in developing a global regulation on bankruptcy for national 
insolvency systems). 
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light, domestic policymakers are resorting to new legal instruments 
like restructuring plans in order to provide corporate executives a 
stronger role and, in turn, with an augmented power of intervention 
in domestic markets. Indeed, since financial insolvencies trigger 
economic and social alarms, it is paramount for governmental 
authorities to provide quick and prompt answers at the disposal of 
large corporations.5 
B. The ‘Domino Effect’ 
The problem of the financial instability of large corporations 
is usually intertwined with cyclical economic crises. As a result, 
sovereign states have typically faced the issue of relying on ad hoc 
laws in order to intervene in a particular industry or for a particular 
corporation.6  As the global financial crisis spread around the world, 
governments have grappled with the idea of establishing general 
regulations for corporate restructuring. Not only would a general 
domestic regulation further an economic purpose in the realm of 
public policy, but it would also tackle the social side effects 
embedded in the crisis.7 
With public interests at stake, the intervention of government 
entities is necessary for complete economic recovery and the 
safeguarding of social values. In fact, contingencies of large 
corporations trigger significant repercussions, almost like a domino 
effect. The crisis generates an economic breakdown amplified with 
effects on all the ancillary activities and subsidiaries of such large 
multinational corporations.8 Additionally, the crisis produces severe 
                                                             
5 See, e.g., RODRIGO OLIVARES-CAMINAL ET AL., DEBT RESTRUCTURING 36 
(2011) (analyzing the legal framework of restructuring plans); see also Christine 
M. Cumming, Managing Crises Without Government Guarantees: How Do We 
Get There?, in OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2011, No. 2 (2012), 15-
7 (analyzing the role of government in managing the financial crisis). 
6 See FLETCHER, supra note 4, at 137–139 (on the evolution of insolvency 
regulation in private international law, from the sphere of natural persons to 
business corporations). 
7 See GERARD MCCORMACK, CORPORATE RESCUE LAW: AN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 209 (2008). 
8 See Jongho Kim, Corporate Restructuring Through Spin-Off Reorganization 
Plan: A Korean Case Study, 23 PACE INT'L L. REV. 41, 43 (2011). 
RESTRUCTURING PLAN AND ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM 
 42 
societal dilemmas, the most salient of which being unemployment.9 
Therefore, the countless consequences of large corporate crises are 
the issue motivating policy-makers find holistic economic and social 
policy solutions for these large-scale economic problems.10   
C. Dichotomy Between Restructuring Plans and 
Bankruptcy Procedures 
The distinction between bankruptcy procedures and 
restructuring plans lies within the rationale of each method. While 
the former is oriented to provide credit protection, the latter is 
focused on business continuity. For example, bankruptcy regulation 
is primarily based on credit protection and only through composition 
with creditors, it allows for the continuation of the business activity. 
Restructuring plans on the other hand, utilize economic and social 
safeguards with the expulsion of the executive management from 
the business entity, to help deliver a revitalized organization to new 
investors.11 In this framework, analyzing the experience of the U.S. 
legal system, through the standards embedded in Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, may serve as an 
example to point out the main features and differences between 
bankruptcy procedures and restructuring plans. 
Bankruptcy procedure is a legal mechanism purely based on 
liquidating the corporation in a solvency crisis. Interpretation of the 
meaning of crisis can range from temporary difficulties to a full state 
of insolvency. It aims to completely dismantle the enterprise, 
through the sale of its assets and with the consequent banishment of 
the corporation from the market. These procedures are designed to 
                                                             
9 See e.g., LAURA HORN, REGULATING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE EU: 
TOWARDS A MARKETIZATION OF CORPORATE CONTROL 168–69 (2012). 
10 See Anderson & Morrison, supra note 3, at 87–90 (analyzing the discipline of 
companies rescue through a comparative perspective, shedding light on the 
British, Australian, and American systems). 
11 See Daniel Hayek, Christina Meyer & Chantal Joris, Restructuring over 
Liquidation, 48 INT’L FIN. L. REV., 48, 48–51 (2015) (analyzing the dual choice 
between restructuring and liquidating corporations in distress). 
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seek protection for creditors.12 
Bankruptcy agreements consist of a negotiation settlement, in 
which the decision to continue the business activity is not imposed 
by law, but is left to the parties involved to determine. In other 
words, the balance between liquidation and continuation is a private 
decision once the status of liability is settled. In the latter case, 
parties shall demonstrate that continuation is practical to the 
satisfaction of creditors.13  
Regulation for restructuring plans take a completely different 
approach. For example, protection of the production system along 
with the continuity of business prevail over the interests of the 
creditors. Therefore, through a reconciliation of the interests at 
stake, the liquidation of corporate assets is mitigated with an eye 
towards market prerogatives and other public needs. 
Restructuring plan regulations also have a special procedure 
in which domestic policymakers tend to balance the interests at stake 
while prioritizing the preservation of the business entity. To be 
found eligible under the restructuring plan regulations, the 
enterprise must be in a state of insolvency. In this situation, 
insolvency is defined as a non-transitory state in which the 
entrepreneur is unable to regularly fulfill corporate obligations.14 
Once the enterprise is found to be eligible, the plan can be activated 
through different scenarios; either as a result of the failure of private 
negotiations, or as a default provision. However, private agreements 
are not always sufficient to grant a business continuation of the 
                                                             
12 Harry Rajak, The Culture of Bankruptcy 3, 17–25, in INTERNATIONAL 
INSOLVENCY LAW supra note 3 (analyzing bankruptcy regulation through a 
comparative perspective, describing the evolution of the British and the 
American systems). 
13 See generally GAUGHAN, supra note 2, at 433 (analyzing when bankruptcy is 
the best option); see also CHRISTOPHER A. WARD, ET AL., AMERICAN 
BANKRUPTCY INSTITUTE, THE CHIEF RESTRUCTURING OFFICER’S GUIDE TO 
BANKRUPTCY: VIEWS FROM LEADING INSOLVENCY PROFESSIONALS 10 (2013). 
14 LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, ET AL., A GLOBAL VIEW OF BUSINESS INSOLVENCY 
SYSTEMS 65 (2010) (analyzing liquidation procedures and the role of liquidators 
in domestic systems from a comparative perspective). 
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enterprise.15 
In conclusion, external and internal considerations must be 
taken into account during large economic crises that negatively 
impact major business entities. If the business executives lose their 
legitimacy or credibility, or if they are no longer willing to continue 
managing the enterprise, then it is the role of the country’s 
regulatory system to intervene through a restructuring plan to 
protect the public interests at stake. In other words, restructuring 
regulations are a set of domestic policies that preserve productivity 
and employment stability, while maintaining the balance between 
the interests of all the relevant stakeholders, not solely creditors.16 
The framework created thus far demonstrates how restructuring 
plans can re-establish the economic balance of corporations in crisis, 
and how tailored regulatory frameworks can attract FDI into 
domestic systems. 
 
II. Analysis  
A. The Italian System 
The regulation of restructuring plans has a long tradition in the 
Italian system, where it has been regulated for nearly forty years 
with different models being adopted over that time period.  In recent 
times, such regulation caught the attention of investors worldwide, 
as the financial crisis triggered new challenges for the Italian 
economic system.17 The cases of ILVA and Alitalia, considered 
amongst the largest domestic Italian corporations, demonstrate the 
                                                             
15 See MCCORMACK supra note 7, at 251. 
16 See MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN 
BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 812 (4th ed., 2012). 
17 See Tiziana Del Prete & Matteo Smacchi, Italy, in THE RESTRUCTURING 
REVIEW, 152, 152 (Cristopher Mallon ed., 7th ed., 2014); see e.g., Stefania 
Pacchi Pescucci, L’amministrazoine Straordinaria delle Imprese di Rilevanti 
Dimensioni [Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations], in TRATTATO DI 
DIRITTO DELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, 833, 833 (U. Apice ed., 2011); see 
also Vittorio Zanichelli, L’amministrazione Straordinaria [The Restructuring 
Plans], in FALLIMENTO E ALTRE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, 2010, 2074 
(Giuseppe Fauceglia & Luciano Panzani, eds., 2009). 
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need for an effective policy and regulatory framework on 
restructuring plans. After analyzing the evolution of the Italian 
system, this Article will focus on current reforms, which are deemed 
necessary to create a sound framework for attracting FDI into Italy. 
B. The Italian Regulatory Framework 
In 1979, the Italian Parliament introduced for the first time a 
regulation on business crises of large corporations.18 In order to 
make it compatible with the European Union framework on 
competition law in the late 1990s, the regulation underwent a 
revision process. On June 17, 1999 the European Court of Justice 
found the Italian law incompatible with European standards and 
specifically, with the regime on competition and state aid.19 The EU 
system does not allow automatic state aid, especially without any 
sort of distinction between meritorious and unworthy enterprises. 
Following the Court’s ruling on compliance with the EU legal 
framework on competition, Italy further revised the regulatory 
system with Legislative Decree no. 270 in 1999.20 This was the so-
called “Prodi” procedure, named after Minister Romano Prodi.  
With this reform, Italy opted for a model that required reliance on 
the judiciary to administer the plan.21 Italian courts were then 
pressed to decide, whether the application of the Prodi procedure 
was compliant with the already existing restructuring regulatory 
system. The Italian Constitutional Court affirmed that the new 
procedure was compliant and that governmental authorities should 
both implement and manage the restructuring plan.22 
                                                             
18 The first regulation on restructuring plans for large enterprises was adopted 
with the Law Decree 30 January 1979, n. 26 – converted with modifications into 
the Law no. 953 of 3 April 1979. See Decreto Legge 3 aprile 1979, n.95, G.U. 
Apr. 4, 1979, n.94 (It.).  
19 Case C-295/97, Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio SpA v. 
International Factors Italia SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-03735. 
20 D.L. n.94/1979 (It.). 
21 See Steffen Koch, Restructuring: The German Approach, 3 INSOLVENCY & 
RESTRUCTURING INT’L, 27, 28 (2009) (analyzing the judiciary-based model, also 
with regard to its application in the German system). 
22 The Italian Constitutional Court analyzed the compliance of the procedure of 
the Law Decree n.26/1979 under the standards of the Italian Constitution. See 
RESTRUCTURING PLAN AND ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM 
 46 
According to the restructuring regulation, only three classes of 
actors are authorized to initiate such procedures, including: the 
business’ executives; one or more creditors of the enterprise; or the 
public prosecutor, ex oficio.23 Once the request to restructure is 
received, the Court issues a decision to declare the state of 
insolvency. The Court then appoints a judicial committee, 
determining whether the management of the enterprise should be 
left to the insolvent entrepreneur or entrusted to the latter body – 
composed of either one or three commissioners – previously 
designated by the Ministry of Economic Development. 24 
After declaring a state of insolvency, the Court opens an 
observation period, which consists of two different phases: First, 
there is a period of 30 days granted to the judicial commission; then, 
there is another period of 30 days for the Court to decide whether 
the situation is ripe to begin the restructuring plan, based on the 
opinion of the Ministry of Economic Development and observations 
presented by creditors.25 
In its report, the judicial committee indicates the causes of the 
state of insolvency and expresses, with reasoned assessment, that 
either current conditions support the implementation of a 
restructuring plan or do not. The report carries out a prognosis of the 
situation and methods for recovering the economic balance of the 
business activity. Moreover, the document includes an analysis and 
estimate of the corporation’s assets, a list of creditors, and an 
                                                             
Corte Cost., 11 novembre 1987, n. 401; see also Corte Cost., 20 dicembre 1982, 
n. 244 (as the Court stated, compliance of the regulation with restructuring plans 
is grounded in the rationale of rehabilitation, which is of paramount interest to 
all relevant stakeholders, including creditors). 
23 Decreto Legislativo 8 luglio 1999, n.270, art. 2, G.U Aug. 9, 1999, n.185 (It.) 
(regulating the procedure for invoking restructuring plan in the Italian system). 
24 See Giorgio Oppo, Profilo Sistematico dell’Amministrazione Straordinaria 
delle Grandi Imprese in Crisi [System Profiles of Restructuring Plans of Large 
Corporations in Crisis], in VIRIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE, 233 et seq. (1981) 
(discussion about the procedural aspects of the regulation). 
25 See Renato Rordorf, Le Procedure Concorsuali e la «Par condicio» fra 
Diritto Positivo, Usi Alternativi e Prospettive di Riforma, LA TUTELA DEI 
DIRITTI SOGGETTIVI NELLE PROCEDURE CONCORSUALI, QUADERNI DEL C.S.M., 
n.25, 15 et seq. (1989).  
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indication of their respective interests. This preliminary procedure 
gives grounds for the Court to formulate its own assessments 
regarding the measure to be implemented.26 
The Court, after analyzing the report of the judicial committee, 
has two options.27 Given suggestions to recover the economic 
balance, the Court could start the restructuring plan of the business 
entity; otherwise, it could issue a bankruptcy decree. 
If the Court decides to establish a restructuring procedure, 
then government agencies were authorized to take action. The 
Ministry of Economic Development, within five days, appoints an 
extraordinary committee composed by one or three 
Commissioners,28 typically constituted of the same individuals who 
had already served as judicial commissioner.29 
In 2003, the Italian parliament passed a reform to the “Prodi” 
procedure, moving to an executive-managed model. The so-called 
“Marzano” procedure, named after the proposing Minister Antonio 
Marzano, established “urgent measures for industrial restructuring 
of large enterprises in crisis in order to intervene in a concrete case 
of emergency.30 This reform was initiated in response to problems 
within the Italian agricultural industry, as swift public intervention 
was needed. 31 
                                                             
26 See e.g. Pescucci, supra note 17. 
27 D. Lgs. n. 270/1999, arts. 27–30 (regulating procedural aspects and the role 
the Judiciary plays in it, authorizing restructuring plans). 
28 Id. art. 38 (regulating the composition and tasks of the extraordinary 
committee). 
29 See Giorgio Marinucci, La nuova disciplina dell’amministrazione 
straordinaria delle grandi imprese in stato di insolvenza [The New Regulation 
on Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations in State of Insolvency], 
Commentary to D. Lgs. n.270/1999, 299 (Angelo Castagnola & Roberto Sacchi 
eds., 2000). 
30 Decreto Legge 23 dicembre 2003, n.347, Dec. 24, 2003, G.U. n.298 (It.). 
31 See generally Stefano Ambrosini, Fallimento, Soluzioni Negoziate della 
Crisi e Disciplina Bancaria dopo le riforme del 2015 e 2016 [Insolvency, 
Negotiated Solutions of Crisis and Banking Discipline after 2015 and 2016 
Reforms], in STRUMENTI DEL DIRITTO FALLIMENTARE, 779 (A. Signorelli ed., 
2017).  
RESTRUCTURING PLAN AND ROLE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE ITALIAN SYSTEM 
 48 
This new model incorporated the need for swift and timely 
interventions. Under this reform, executive authorities, following a 
request to public authorities, could now autonomously decide 
whether the conditions for the restructuring plan are met and how to 
deal with the crisis. Shifting away from the prior model, the Italian 
parliament designed a relevant role for government to play in such 
plan. Under this framework, the Ministry of Economic Development 
was entrusted as a third and impartial authority to the manage the 
procedure. Indeed, government intervention seemed to better suit 
the challenges faced by large corporations, where social and 
economic principles are more centrally at stake.32 
Under the Marzano reform, judicial administration is set aside 
from the procedure for three reasons. First, managing business crises 
does not fall under the Italian judiciary’s mandate. Second, the 
judiciary lacks the adequate tools for crisis management as the 
length of judicial procedures do not correspond well with the need  
to achieve a swift resolution and appreciation of social interests, for 
which public administration may better serve. Third, only the 
government has the instruments to promote industrial restructuring 
and conversion processes.33 
Pursuant to this new reform on restructuring, state intervention 
in crisis management is tailored to the impact that the crisis has in 
the public sector. Thus, the greater the impact is, the quicker the 
intervention should be. With a reasonable pleading and appropriate 
documentation, corporations dealing with financial emergencies 
may request the Court for insolvency status and the Ministry of 
Economic Development for the immediate admission to the 
                                                             
32 See ROBERTO MARRAFFA, AMMINISTRAZIONE STRAORDINARIA DELLE GRANDI 
IMPRESE IN CRISI E TUTELA DEI CREDITORI [RESTRUCTURING PLANS OF LARGE 
CORPORATIONS IN CRISIS AND CREDITORS’ PROTECTION] 6–7 (2012) (analyzing 
the role of the government in the procedure); see generally Luca Ponti & 
Francesca Spadetto, L’amministrazione Straordinaria Delle Grandi Imprese In 
Crisi [Restructuring Plans of Large Corporations] (2006) (highlighting the need 
for alternative insolvency procedures to bankruptcy for large corporations). 
33 See Fabrizio Di Marzo & Francesco Macario, Amministrazione Straordinaria 
delle Grandi Imprese in Stato di Insolvenza [Restructuring Plans of Large 
Corporations in Insolvency Status], in TRATTATO DELLE PROCEDURE 
CONCORSUALI, 601 (A. Jorio, B.N. Sassani eds., 2017). 
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restructuring plan. In order to identify the subjects eligible for 
restructuring plans, current Italian procedures set out two 
requirements based on employment features and patrimonial 
structure.34 First, the corporation shall have more than two hundred 
subordinate employees for at least one year. Second, it holds total 
amount of debts in the amount of two-thirds or more of both total 
assets and revenues from sales and services in the previous financial 
year. In the case of a holding company, the activation of a 
restructuring plan does not extend to the entity’s other companies.  
Conditions for access to the restructuring plan for a complete 
holding company are determined in the prospects for recovering 
economic balance, or the opportunity to successfully manage the 
insolvency of the group.35 Nonetheless, once the Ministry of 
Economic Development receives a pleading a holding company, it 
retains the authority to directly admit the holding company to the 
restructuring plan.  
Designing the restructuring plan is a task given to the same 
committee appointed by the Ministry of Economic Development, 
under the supervision of the Ministry itself. This operation must be 
tailored to comply with domestic industrial policy guidelines, in 
order to safeguard the unity of business entities, while also taking 
the interests of creditors into account. Within 60 days from the first 
decree, the committee submits a final draft of the restructuring plan 
to the Ministry of Economic Development.36 Within 15 days from 
the executive decree, the Court declares the insolvency status of the 
corporation. 
Throughout the execution of the plan, dialogue between the 
committee and the Ministry is maintained through regular reports on 
the business performance of the corporation submitted every three 
                                                             
34 D.L. n.347/2003, art. 2 (It.) (identifying the subjects eligible for restructuring 
plans). 
35 See Nicolò Baccetti, Requisiti per l’ammissione [Requirements for 
Admission], in LA LEGGE MARZANO, COMMENTARIO, 1–45 (Angelo Castagnola 
& Roberto Sacchi eds., 2006) (analyzing the prospects of recovering as a 
requirement for the procedure). 
36 D.L. n. 347/2003, art. 54 (It.) ((defining the procedural requirements 
necessary to issue a restructuring plan).  
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months, including a status of implementation of the program.  
During this time, the committee is entitled to take control of the 
enterprise’s management by administering corporate assets.37  
Eventually, at the end of the procedure, a final report indicates 
whether the objectives were met, or whether the procedure failed.  
If, over the course of the implementation period, the restructuring 
plan is found to no longer be effectively applied, the committee can 
request the Court to convert the restructuring plan into a bankruptcy 
procedure. 
C. Case Studies: ILVA and Alitalia 
This analysis will now shed light on the state of emergency for 
two major Italian corporations, ILVA and Alitalia. Considered to be 
economic backbones for the national economic system, these 
corporations serve as empirical studies to benchmark the role of 
restructuring plans moving forward. 
ILVA is a large Italian corporation with a long standing 
tradition in the steel sector.38 Founded in 1905, it helped guide Italy 
through its industrialization process. Today, the corporation has 
more than twelve thousand employees, with its main office in 
Taranto. Since 2015, ILVA has been undergoing a restructuring plan 
pursuant to the Marzano procedure.39 The plan encompassed the 
whole group of ILVA, including subsidiaries in order to reorder and 
re-launch the industrial potential of the corporation. In line with the 
purpose of the restructuring regime, the plan has three main goals.  
First, it aims to safeguard productivity. Since ILVA has a productive 
structure with several braches across Italy, the restructuring plan 
seems to be a sound strategy for both local prosperity and the 
stability of the national economy. Second, it aims to deliver a solid 
and reliable result that will ensure business prosperity and 
sustainable growth into the future. Third, it seeks to create a strategic 
                                                             
37 Id. art. 40 (delimiting the competence of the committee). 
38 ILVA GROUP, http://www.gruppoilva.com/en (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
39 With the Ministerial Decree of 21 January 2015, ILVA s.p.a. has entered 
restructuring plan procedures for shifting corporate management under the 
control of an extraordinary committee, pursuant to the Law Decree no. 347, 
2003. See Decreto Ministeriale 21 gennaio 2015 pursuant to D.L. n.347/2003. 
See also supra IIIA. 
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role for ILVA, not only at the national level, but also in international 
markets, so that it can interact with foreign partners and attract 
foreign investors.40  
The ILVA restructuring plan resulted in an acquisition 
proposal issued by AM Investco Italy, a joint venture represented by 
85% ArcelorMittal and 15% Marcegaglia Group. Following the 
proposal, and after hearing relevant stakeholders involved in the 
process on June 5, 2017, the Ministry of Economic Development 
signed a decree to start adjudication for the ILVA industrial 
complex.41 The EU Commission is scrutinizing the validity of this 
decision under the EU standards on competition law, and it will 
presumably issue a decision by October 26, 2017.42     
Established in 1947, Alitalia has more than eleven thousand 
employees, therefore meeting the requirements to be considered a 
large corporation under Italian legislation. The company has been 
going through a long-term financial crisis since 2008, spanning two 
different regimes of ownership.43 With continued losses in Spring 
2017, the corporation attempted to negotiate an agreement for 
business recapitalization between the corporate management board 
and trade unions. Nonetheless, an internal referendum held on April 
                                                             
40 Extraordinary Administration, ILVA GROUP, 
http://www.gruppoilva.com/en/governance/governance/extraordinary-
administration (last visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
41 See Firmato il decreto di aggiudicazione del complesso industriale del 
Gruppo Ilva ad Am Investco Italy, MINISTRY OF ECON. DEV. (Jun. 5, 2017), 
http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/index.php/it/per-i-media/comunicati-
stampa/2036649-calenda-firma-il-decreto-di-aggiudicazione-del-complesso-
industriale-del-gruppo-ilva-ad-am-investco-italy. 
42 See Matteo Menghello, Ilva, contatti Mittal-Arvedi bussa in vista del verdetto 
dell’antitrust europeo, IL SOLE 24 ORE (Sept. 23, 2017) 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/impresa-e-territori/2017-09-23/ilva-arvedi-
bussa-vista-un-no-dell-antitrust--
184620.shtml?uuid=AEjYKeYC&refresh_ce=1. 
43 Alitalia was first acquired by CAI (Compagnia Aerea Italiana) Group in 2009, 
and then in 2015 it started a joint venture with Etihad Airways, where the latter 
holds 49% of corporate capital. See Alitalia, 
AIRLINEFILES.COMhttp://airlinefiles.com/alitalia?showall=1&limitstart= (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2018). 
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25, 2017 rejected this agreement.44 As a result of the referendum, 
and given the financial distress of the corporation, on May 2, 2017 
the board filed a request to the Government for a restructuring 
plan.45 The Ministry for Economic Development, pursuant to the 
Marzano procedure, appointed an ad hoc committee for the 
corporation to carry out interim management.46 Since the 
Government excluded a priori in its declarations, the opportunity to 
nationalize the company through a public bid process, the committee 
has been working on a new plan to reposition the corporation in 
domestic and international markets.47 
Restructuring plans are necessary for cases like ILVA and 
Alitalia, two pillars of the Italian economic system. The 
Government’s decision to initiate the plans not only aims to 
safeguard corporations amongst the largest in the Italian economy, 
but also to avoid systemic economic risk. Considering the scale of 
their operations, downward economic and social effects would 
impact the country not only at the local level, but also on a national 
scale. In this respect, undergoing a restructuring plan with the intent 
of attracting FDI may represent a fresh start for these debtors’ 
business affairs. It is therefore essential that Italy secures a legal and 
administrative framework to establish a fertile ground for foreign 
investors in respect to these two companies. To this end, the 
opportunity for reformation of the current restructuring plan 
regulations is particularly timely and necessary.  
D. The Opportunity for Reform and Future Scenarios 
Italian policymakers are currently discussing a reform on 
                                                             
44 See Giorgio Pogliotti, Referendum Alitalia, vince il «no», IL SOLE 24 ORE 
(Apr. 25, 2017) http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-04-24/referendum-
alitalia-vince-no-230012.shtml. 
45 Comunicato Stampa 2 maggio 2017, ALITALIA (May 2, 2017), 
http://corporate.alitalia.it/it/media/comunicati-sai/2017-05-02.html. 
46 Decreto 2 maggio 2017, G.U. May 6, 2017, n.104 (It.) pursuant to D.L. n. 
347/2003 (It.). 
47 See Giorgio Pogliotti, Alitalia, i Commissari: oltre 600 milioni ancora 
disponibili, IL SOLE 24 ORE (Jun. 14, 2017), 
http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2017-06-14/alitalia-commissari-oltre-
600-milioni-ancora-disponibili--173420.shtml?uuid=AEuSnYeB&refresh_ce=1. 
THE ARBITRATION BRIEF 
 53 
domestic insolvency procedures within the parliament. The Ministry 
of Justice’s commission, established in 2015 by executive decree, 
was tasked to create proposals for amendments to the current 
regulation for insolvency procedures. The Ministry of Justice, 
through its relevant subcommittees and in coordination with the 
Ministry of Economic Development, aims to provide an organic 
framework that harmonizes the judiciary’s needs with 
administrative prerogatives in restructuring plans for large 
corporations in crisis.48 
The reform integrates provisions contained in Legislative 
Decree no. 270/1999, or the Prodi procedure, with those embedded 
in Law Decree n. 347/2003 and subsequent amendments, or the 
Marzano procedure, for possible regulatory improvements.49 Based 
on the principle of transparency, these procedures promote 
independence and integrity.   
The goal is to create a harmonized regulatory framework that 
is able to foster the revitalization of troubled businesses and solve 
financial crises for Italian corporations. The subject matter of the 
reform is limited to large corporations, in order to prevent systemic 
risks in the domestic economy. 
Reforms to the restructuring regulations include procedural 
steps like structural requirements for corporations to be admitted to 
a restructuring plan, and the criteria for the appointment of the 
extraordinary committee. It harmonizes domestic regulation within 
the EU framework to comply with the EU Commission 
Recommendation 2003/361/EC set forth on May 6, 2003 which the 
defined micro, small, and medium sized enterprises, and also raises 
the minimum number of employees for the corporation to be eligible 
                                                             
48 See Luciano Panzani, Conservazione dell’impresa, interesse pubblico e tutela 
dei creditori: considerazioni a margine della Proposta di direttiva in tema di 
armonizzazione delle procedure di ristrutturazione [Conservation of the 
Business, of Public Interest and Creditors’ Protection: Considerations as a 
Result of the Proposal for a Directive on Harmonization of Restructuring 
Procedures], CRISI D’IMPRESA E FALLIMENTO (Sept. 11, 2017), 
http://blog.ilcaso.it/libreriaFile/977.pdf. 
49 See Del Prete & Smacchi, supra, note 17. 
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for the plan from 200 to 250.50 Current quantitative requirements 
related to the number of employees and the volume of revenues and 
assets, should not be replaced by qualitative parameters related to 
the strategic relevance of the corporation within the framework of 
the national economic system. In this light, the regulation is 
designed to comply with the EU system and, in particular, with the 
provisions on competition and state aid. 
State aid, pursuant to the meaning of Article 107 (1) of the 
Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union, is meant to favor 
certain businesses or certain industries. This framework risks 
distorting or threatening EU competition while also affecting trade 
between Member States.51 As a result, restructuring plans may fall 
under the restrictions of state aid regulations, as far as it would allow 
a selective advantage to certain corporations or economic sectors to 
remain profitable in the market, solely based on a discretionary 
provision.52 
The current reform is tailored to adjust Italian restructuring 
regulation to comply with the the EU framework on competition 
law. In order to maintain a balanced economic and social framework 
in the domestic system, and in compliance with the EU system, only 
cases of relevant downward economic effects of corporate crisis 
may public intervention be initiated.   
This means that the corporation entrusts the government with 
the authority of corporate management. As an impartial actor, the 
government is tasked with returning a solid and reliable business 
                                                             
50 Commission Recommendation of 6 May 2003, U.N. Doc. 2003/361/EC (May 
6, 2003) (recommending that a medium company has less than 250 employees, 
with an annual turnover that does not exceed 50 million euros and a total annual 
budget that does not exceed 43 million euros). 
51 See Nikolaos E. Farantouris, EU Competition Policy on State Aid for Rescuing 
and Restructuring Companies, in THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW 
CHALLENGES (Ioannis Lianos & Ioannis Kokkoris eds., 2010) (analyzing EU 
competition standards in light of restructuring legal framework in the common 
market). 
52 See Case C-295/97, Industrie Aeronautiche e Meccaniche Rinaldo Piaggio 
SpA v. International Factors Italia SpA, 1999 E.C.R. I-03735; see also Case C-
200-97, Ecotrade Srl v. Altiforni e Ferriere di Servola SpA, 1998 E.C.R. I-7907. 
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entity back to the market, cleansed from previous irresponsibility.  
On the other hand, it also creates a sound administrative and legal 
environment to allow FDI to enter and thrive in the domestic system.   
Rather than having a system based on ad hoc laws to provide 
urgent solutions to individual cases, the Italian parliament is seeking 
to establish an organic legal and administrative framework for 
restructuring plans. With an ex ante regulation that is in compliance 
with EU competition standards, it will provide an effective and 
updated tool to address large corporate crises in the future. 
Given the persistence of the financial crisis, Italian 
policymakers are essential to prevent large corporate crises from 
having a collateral impact on Italian society. These reforms seek to 
establish a faster approach to make the current restructuring plan 
procedures more transparent and less onerous for the corporations.  
CONCLUSION 
Since most of the economies affected by the global financial 
crisis are struggling in restarting growth, structural and institutional 
reforms are key for the achievement of macroeconomic stability.  
Restructuring plans have been enacted in economies facing crisis in 
order to encourage and protect foreign investments. Some countries, 
like Italy and the U.S., have adopted revised foreign investment laws 
that offer investors essential guarantees and protections. Based on a 
program that not only guarantees business continuity, but also 
safeguards employment rates, restructuring plans aim at returning 
corporations in crisis to profitability for domestic economic 
stability. These plans provide foreign investors with a just and equal 
legal regime, as well as continuous protection. Moreover, 
restructuring plans are tailored to transform a previously struggling 
economic entity into a solid, reliable, and safe entity cleansed from 
its previous debts. Consequently, efforts to improve legislation on 
foreign investments and current restructuring plans are oriented 
toward the creation of a legal regime that is consistent with 
international standards on competition and transparency. 
